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Abstract: Over the past ten years or so, the position of Liberal Nationalism has progressed 
from being an apparent oxymoron to a widely accepted view. In this paper I sketch the most 
promin�nt liberal defenses of nationalism, focusing first on the difficulties of specifying 
criteria of nationhood, then criticizing what I take to be the most promising, culture-based 
defense, forwarded by Will Kymlicka. I argue that such an approach embroils one in a 
pernicious conservatism completely at odds with the global justice concerns that I take to 
be central to liberalism with its core values of equality and liberty. 
Let us define nationalism as the thesis that every nation should have itsown state. In this paper I argue that a liberal cannot mount a defense of such 
a policy without involving herself in contradiction. Implicit in the defini­
tion is the assertion that states are distinct from nations, a difference much 
pressed in the currently burgeoning philosophical literature on nationalism, 
if ignored in the colloquial use of the terms.2 Typically, to illustrate this dis­
tinction, examples are presented both of multinational states (arguably Great 
Britain and Canada) as well as single nations distributed across distinct states 
(Postwar Germany up until 1989). 3 It is generally agreed that states are simply 
political entities, consisting of the institutions and apparatus of govemment.4 
Nations, on the other hand, are trickier to define. They are not, unlike coun­
tries, chunks of land or geographical entities. Almost unanimously it is agreed 
that a nation is a group of people.5 The challenge for the nationalist, then, is 
to show that nations are the kinds of groups that should have the autono­
mous sovereignty that the apparatus of statehood brings, given the fundamental 
impact that statehood has both on the lives of the nationals and non-nationals 
affected and on the international landscape. The challenge for the liberal 
nationalist is to do so within the confines of liberal principles. Can such a 
thing be done? On this question, consensus appears to have shifted over the 
past decade. Yael Tamir in her 1993 book Liberal Nationalism felt the need to 
defend the titular term against the charge that it was an oxymoron. 6 However, 
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in a talk presented less than five years later, Will Kymlicka reported that 
"there seems to be growing acceptance of the legitimacy of some or other 
form of liberal nationalism. "7 It is certainly true that increasing numbers of 
liberal political theorists have attempted to show that liberalism's twin ide­
als of liberty and equality are not only compatible with, but may even 
presuppose a commitment to nationalism in some form. Liberals have sup­
ported secession drives by former colonies, from East Timor to Lithuania to 
Scotland, in the name of liberty, specifically the right to self-government of 
national groups.8 Liberals of an egalitarian bent support institutions like 
state welfare or health-care systems that, while not necessarily nationalis­
tic, are currently restricted to within nation-states, and, several writers 
have suggested,9 are nationalistic in that they require a shared nationality 
for members to accept the justice of the redistributive efforts. Partly for the 
foregoing reasons, growing numbers of writers have argued that national­
ism has long been an unacknowledged element of liberalism, from Rousseau 10 
through Mill to Rawls. 11 
On the face of it, however, the core values of liberalism do not appear to 
sit well with nationalism. Liberalism is inherently individualistic, yet nation­
alism in its most familiar forms is holistic, usually requiring the valuing of 
the nation as an entity above the goods of the individuals that comprise it. 
Furthermore, even the allegedly egalitarian side of nationalism appears to 
run counter to liberalism's commitment to respect equally the basic rights 
and liberties of all humans. A welfare state that operates only within a com­
paratively wealthy nation-state like Germany will redistribute goods to poor 
Germans who are already far better off than vast numbers of potential recipi­
ents (Afghans, for example) who are excluded by the system's national bias. 12 
The current system of nation-states directly affects pressing issues of global 
justice. Nationalists can claim to be defending the right of all nations in the world 
to control their own destinies, but in effect this means that wealth and resources 
are controlled by Western powers, and individuals born into poverty-stricken 
countries cannot hope to approach the standard of living of their First World 
counterparts. It also means, of course, that the wealthiest states can control the 
world agenda and consume and pollute out of all proportion to their populations. 
This aspect of nationalism is less discussed in the literature, which tends to focus 
on the rights of minority nations to autonomy from states controlled by larger 
nations. In my view, however, a liberal defense of nationalism must explain how a 
system of nation states better respects the basic rights of humans than a drive 
to globalize redistributive systems of justice. 
Meeting this challenge requires first a definition of the nation. Pur­
ported criteria of nationhood fall into two main categories: what I shall call 
objective and subjective. By objective criteria of nationhood I simply mean 
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features shared by a group of people irrespective of their wills. 13 Shared 
language, homeland, ethnicity, history, and culture are all candidates that 
have been put forward.14 
There are two basic problems with such criteria. First, whenever each crite­
rion is examined alone, it is possible to come up with counterexamples to show 
that it appears to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of a nation.15 
Consider language, for example-an important motivation for nationalist drives 
in Quebec and the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain, among many others. Eric 
Hobsbawm points out that in 1789, only 50% of French people spoke French, 
and when Italy was unified in 1860, only 2.5% ofltahans spoke Italian. 16 Hobsbawm
and others conclude that a shared language is not necessary for a people to consti­
tute a nation, and that indeed shared languages are more often the result of 
nation-building practices than the motivation for them. 17 The idea of a nomadic 
nation is not incoherent, so a homeland is not necessary. Polyethnic nations seem 
plausible, the US being an apparent notable example, and histories have often 
been retroactively created for existing nations. Ernest Renan famously remarked 
that "To forget and-I will venture to say-to get one's history wrong, are essen­
tial factors in the making of a nation; and thus the advance of historical studies is 
often a danger to nationality. "18 
The second problem of objective criteria is for the liberal nationalist rather 
than nationalists in general. Liberalism, with its focus on the individual and its 
twin ideals of liberty and equality, has long been the enemy of chauvinisms. 
Sexism and racism are rejected by liberals because they involve a violation of 
equal respect for all humans and typically entail the curtailment of particular 
liberties on the basis of human features that are deemed by liberalism to be 
morally irrelevant. One would think, therefore, that if one's nationality is as 
beyond one's control as one's (initial) sex or race are typically assumed to be, 
then liberalism should condemn nationalism by association. Perhaps there is no 
inherent wrong simply in categorizing people according to the objective features 
put forward as relevant to nationality,19 while this is less clearly true of race and 
sex, but the nationalist calls for a person's nationality to have serious political 
ramifications, with results that can be horrific, as events over the past decade in 
the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa have illustrated.20 
It cannot be denied, however, that vast numbers of people identify them­
selves as possessing a nationality, and wish this feature of themselves to have 
political import. This suggests that respect for individuals can itself lead to 
· nationalism, where the nation is constituted subjectively, each one com­
prised of those who see themselves as part of it. On this view a nation is, in
the oft-quoted words of Renan, a "daily plebiscite,"21 or in Benedict Anderson's
phrase, "an imagined community."22 Yael Tamir puts it this way: "A nation,
like lovers or friends, is the kind of group whose existence cannot be inferred
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from the mere existence of certain shared objective features but must refer to 
the members' shared consciousness and feelings of communion. "23 
The subjective approach seems potentially compatible with liberalism, 
and indeed the voluntaristic aspect of it mirrors liberalism's social contract 
tradition. However, questions need answering about this approach, too. First, 
how many people have to conceive of themselves as sharing a nation for their 
so doing to constitute a nation? If all that co-nationals have in common is 
their self-perceived co-nationality, this does not settle any substantive prop­
erties of nations to differentiate them from other groups that meet this 
standard-sororities, fan clubs, international brother-and-sisterhoods of 
chartered accountants, et al.-without being nations. Second, is my nation­
ality solely my choice, or does it depend on others' acceptance? Can I decide 
to be French unilaterally? Aside from purely ontological issues, if nation­
hood carries with it the right to form a state it should not be the case that we 
could have 250 million individual nations in the US alone. On the other 
hand, if others' acceptance is required, this opens the door to a majority 
excluding willing minorities, rather like country clubs keeping out hoi polloi. 
Third, are there standards for what can count as a basis for my decision? If, 
as seems very likely, those reasons are identification with a nation whose 
history is largely fabricated in the manner that Renan positively encouraged, 
doesn't that taint or undermine the nation itself?24 
These three challenges suggest to some writers--David Miller and Yael Tamir, 
notably-that the best definition of a nation must involve both objective and sub­
jective features. 25 Subjective to avoid the charge of illiberality, objective to provide 
a basis for the subjective ascription of nationality thereby to distinguish nations 
from other types of groups. Such a combination provides a response to the three 
challenges to a solely subjective definition. First, the number of people is settled 
by the number of people who share the relevant objective feature or features­
say, the French nation consists of all French speakers who share a distinctive 
common culture that finds its home on French soil. Second, therefore, I cannot 
decide to be French if the relevant objective features cannot be ascribed to me. If I 
have never set foot on French-controlled territory, am unfamiliar with French 
culture and do not speak a word of the language, then however earnestly I wish to 
describe myself as French, I am not. While my case is perhaps sad, note that what 
prevents my self-ascribed Frenchness successfully realizing a French nationality is 
not the decision of others to exclude me. I may curse my luck but I cannot claim 
that my exclusion is an intentional snubbing. Finally, my decision must be 
based on conscious acknowledgment by me of my own possession of the 
relevant characteristic(s), and not on some strange whim. Nationality must 
be rational at some level, which perhaps would help to eliminate the worst 
bases for nationalist sentiment. 
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By requiring objective features, then, the combined approach answers 
objections to a purely subjective definition of the nation. However, there 
are still unanswered questions about the relevant objective features. First, 
what are they? Second, why are those features relevant to possessing a right 
to self-government? And third, supposing such a right exists, is it strong 
enough to justify a system of nation states against the objection of gross 
global injustice? 
Of the objective criteria considered above, culture remains as yet unchal­
lenged. The most promising aspect of culture is that, to a greater extent than 
any of the rival objective criteria, a national culture is within the control of the 
citizens who share it. That is, individuals need not be passive recipients of the 
force that shapes their nationality and by extension their self-identity; instead 
they can help to shape it, and in so doing realize the individual autonomy 
much prized by liberalism. Thus, culture has both an objective aspect-each 
individual experiences her national culture as a fact of life (and therefore 
nations are not individual creations of whimsy)-and a subjective aspect-a 
national culture is a social construct, embodying the ongoing decisions of the 
nation as a human collective. 
Without an argument as to why national cultures are valuable things, 
though, this conception still does not provide a reason for the liberal to 
endorse a system of nation-states. (That is, it is not simply enough that 
the cultures be valued, but that one is both rationally and morally justi­
fied in valuing them.) It is true that national cultures seem to be a fact of 
our direct experience, but so do office cultures, team cultures, youth 
cultures, and so forth, without calls for each of those entities to have its 
own state. 26 Several liberal writers (Ronald Dworkin, Avishai Margalit
and Joseph Raz, among others27) have seen the need for such an argu­
ment and provided variants. Perhaps the most influential distinctively 
liberal argument for protecting national cultures, however, is that devel­
oped by Will Kymlicka.28 
Kyrnlicka's argument has two steps. First, his conception of the prereq­
uisites for liberty requires both that individuals be free to choose their own 
plan of life (they live life "from the inside") and that they be free to revise the 
beliefs that make up that life plan once chosen. Second, he claims that a 
societal culture is essential to liberty so conceived,29 where a societal culture is 
"a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the 
full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recre­
ational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. 
These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated and based on a shared 
language". 30 (That is, essentially a national culture.)
155 
Truth and Objectivity in Social Ethics 
How successfully can this argument be used as a defense of national­
ism? First we must know why protecting societal cultures requires a state for 
each nation. Kymlicka's response is that 
for a culture to survive and develop in the modern world, given the pressures 
towards the creation of a single common culture in each country, it must be a 
societal culture. Given the enormous significance of social institutions in our 
lives, and in determining our options, any culture which is not a societal cul­
ture will be reduced to ever-decreasing marginalization.31 
However, even if we concede (as anthropologists have long argued) that we 
are culturally embedded such that our culture, in Dworkin's words, "pro­
vides the spectacles through which we identify experiences as valuable,"32 as 
well as this further claim that a culture must be embedded in the machinery 
of government to thrive, this is not necessarily an argument for a plurality of 
national cultures, each attached to the institutions of statehood. As Jeremy 
Waldron has pointed out,33 all it establishes is that individuals need access 
to a culture. Kymlicka's response is that movement between cultures is rare 
and difficult, comparable to taking a vow of poverty and entering a religious 
order. For this reason, one should be regarded as being reasonably entitled 
to one's own culture, and not required to give it up. 
I'm not sure how convincing this response is. For one thing, if a state sud­
denly instituted the policy of indoctrinating all children too young yet to have 
their own culture with a single state-sponsored culture, then no movement would 
be required, but it would effectively eliminate the need for statehood for minority 
nations. There are liberal objections to such a proposal, of course, but they tum 
on parents' rights to pass on their culture to their children, and not on the defense 
of the liberty of the children. 
Another implication of Kymlicka's assertion that each individual has a right 
to her particular culture is that, in effect, he is arguing that cultures are the joint 
property of particular groups, to dispose of how they will. I suggest that they 
should instead be viewed as the joint property of the human race. This is not only 
true to our intuitions (who, when hearing of the destruction of giant statues of 
Buddha by the Taliban, and of some of the earliest traces of civilization by Saddam 
Hussein's regime in Iraq, did not think "they have no right!") but accords better 
with what I maintain are the necessary global humanist underpinnings of liberal­
ism. 34 Indeed, the first element of freedom as he conceives it, the freedom to choose 
one's plan of life, requires cultural mobility. 
That is, Kymlicka's culture argument relies only on the second element 
of freedom, the freedom to revise one's beliefs, which, he claims, requires a 
secure cultural framework. However, he also asserts that the freedom to choose 
one's plan of life is essential to liberty. One can imagine a Millian argument 
that there should be the largest possible marketplace of cultures, so that each 
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individual has the opportunity to choose among the widest profusion of con­
ceptual schemes as part of one's experiments in living. This kind of argument 
is a fickle friend to the nationalist: it argues that individual freedom requires 
a profusion of cultures, but the same commitment to maximal choice will be 
an enemy of marrying national cultures to the instruments of statehood, 
with the attendant possibilities of isolationism (particularly if members of 
that culture see it to be threatened).35 Thus, protecting the first element of 
freedom provides an argument both for ensuring that children can switch 
between cultures as painlessly as possible, should they so choose, and for 
denying cultures the right to prohibit entry to outsiders.36 
To assess the implications of Kymlicka's culture-based nationalism, let us 
imagine a small self-contained culture (like the Amish, only perhaps with their 
own language), which we can call the Isham. Recall that the liberal views cultures 
as the creations of their participants. Combine that with Kymlicka's endorsement 
of the freedom to revise one's beliefs and commitments, and what results is that 
the free actions of a culture's participants will alter the culture, and this is not to be 
regretted. If the Isham decide unilaterally to abandon their way of life, then that 
can only be respected as their choice.37 
However, what happens if increasing numbers of Isham choose to leave the 
lifestyle? At what point does the culture cease to be viable as a source of options, 
and indeed become a positive restriction to the few people raised in it? A gradual 
conversion of the Isham culture into that of the dominant state culture would 
seem to be advisable, so that at no point does a particular Isham feel that her 
culture is being destroyed, but at the same time there will never be a time when a 
small band are isolated, with no viable lifestyle left, and called upon to abandon 
their culture "cold turkey." If instead the Isham are granted separate statehood, 
only one aspect of the liberty of Isham children will be maximized, and at the 
same time, the Isham would be granted the right to exclude large numbers of (let 
us stipulate) much poorer immigrants in the name of protecting their culture. But 
why should the Isham deny indigents access to valuable resources in the name of 
protecting a culture? Because, says Kymlicka, their incursion would diminish a 
culture that provides a context of choice for its members, abandonment of which 
would be very difficult. However, it would not be difficult for all members, only 
those adults set in their ways. But all adults even within cultures face something 
similar over the course of their lives. 
Consider the following story that aired on National Public Radio a couple 
of years ago, related by a man whose parents were Belgian immigrants. They 
worked for many years in the U.S., all the time insisting that they would 
retire to Belgium when they'd earned enough. Well, the time came, and they 
did indeed return to Belgium. They were back in New Jersey within two 
years. His analysis: they realized they were not nostalgic for Belgium; they 
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were nostalgic for the '50s. Every time I return to England and see everyone 
talking on cell phones and measuring things in kilos and litres, I know the 
feeling. As people get older, they find themselves more and more marginalized 
by what is supposedly their own culture. Must the culture they feel comfort­
able with be granted statehood too? Certainly their plight is important, and 
they must be included as much as is possible, but ideally by assimilation 
into the modern world. 38 
Kymlicka bemoans the fact that Dworkin, for example, has too homogenized 
a view of societal culture. But I think he is guilty of ignoring the divergence of 
cultural worldviews among generations within a single nation. Certainly he can 
argue that they share a great many things in common, and in particular, a com­
mitment to institutions like the rule of law and (in the U.S.) a divided 
government. But again, these similarities are as a result of sharing a state, 
and cannot be used to justify statehood for nations. 
Kymlicka insists that nationalism is not going away in the face of increas­
ing liberalization of cultures. He points to the fact that support for Quebec 
nationalism has paradoxically increased with the decreasing distinctiveness of 
the Quebec way of life. 39 Viewed in the light of the combined criteria for 
nationality that we discussed earlier, this would seem to suggest that the 
people of Quebec are acting irrationally-the strength of their subjective 
ascription of nationality is rising when the basis for such ascription is ebb­
ing away. This seems to me an indication that, despite liberal nationalists' 
insistence otherwise, nationalism at root is as its critics have always charged 
it to be, just another instance of humanity's impulse to clump in groups for 
the purpose of excluding others, an impulse which seems strongest the more 
similar those people are. A favorite illustration of this tendency is the scene in 
Monty Python's Life of Brian, where the leader of the People's Front of Judea 
(membership, approximately 3) reacts with disgusted horror at Brian's confu­
sion of that group with the Judean People's Front. Experience with student 
politics also gave me the distinct impression that the less distinguishable two 
organizations are, the greater the vitriol discharged between them. It is cer­
tainly odd that Kymlicka should cite this example with approval. If the Quebec 
culture finally becomes indistinguishable from its neighbors, then there is no 
culture-based argument for its statehood any more.40 
At the outset, I quoted Kymlicka stating that there was emerging con­
sensus over liberal nationalism. On his view, "According to liberal 
nationalism, it is a legitimate function of the state to protect and promote 
the national cultures and languages of the nations within its borders. "41 
Kymlicka's nationalism is clearly a more subtle and complex entity than my 
simple definition would allow, as his nationalism is compatible with multi­
nation states so long as there are "schemes of federalism or consocialism to 
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enable national minorities to exercise self-government." However, elsewhere42 
he argues that federalism will almost inevitably lead to secession anyway, so 
perhaps his view would in effect collapse into a call for statehood for each 
nation. 43 Even should it not, though, his view is that there is general consen­
sus around the claim that national cultures deserve state protection, for the 
simple reason that "there is no clear alternative position. "44 
Several possibilities present themselves. One interpretation of the claim 
is that liberal nationalism is the only position that is not morally repugnant. 
I think such a claim would flounder. As I have argued, the conceptual appa­
ratus of liberalism can only clearly be employed to protect national cultures 
when illiberal acts are committed in their destruction. But, while such cases 
are depressingly common in the real world, they are not sufficient to under­
pin a thoroughgoing nationalism. Other, non-national, cultures might be 
equally valued. 45 
Another possible interpretation of the claim is that there are no well­
conceived alternatives in ideal theory. That would be a bold dismissal of the 
so-called cosmopolitan position, whose defenders are growing in number 
apace with the liberal nationalists, and include Brian Barry, David Waldron, 
David Held and Thomas Pogge, for example. Also, such a claim would entail 
classifying liberal nationalism as an ideal theory. While I have fewer principled 
objections to an ideal liberal nationalism that calls for independence for each 
nation, with genuine equality of resources maintained amongst nations, such a 
position leads one into tangled disputes about the nature of nations that 
create more problems than they solve. Moreover, ideal liberal nationalism 
loses the strongest appeal of any kind of nationalism-that it acknowledges 
the reality of actually existing national cultures and sentiments. For this 
reason, I think that the safest interpretation of Kymlicka's claim is that lib­
eral nationalism is the only morally defensible compromise between theory 
and the world as we know it, that acknowledges and attempts to accommo­
date the central value of nationality to one's identity. 
On this view, liberal nationalism must cater to the needs of already famil­
iar national cultures, with already entrenched claims to resources and territories. 
If this is how we are to take the position, then I contend that so-called liberal 
nationalism is in effect perniciously conservative.46 Consider, for example, 
David Miller's apparently radical defense of nationalism as the best barrier 
against the culture-sapping forces of global capitalism. 47 On closer inspec­
tion, this argument commands us to protect fairly wealthy cultures, such as 
France's or Italy's, at the expense of the cultures of poorer nations who will 
never be in a position to enforce culture-preserving measures anyway. Besides 
which, for whom are these valuable cultures being preserved? If it is the already­
privileged members of these first-world nations, then we are conceding that it 
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is justifiable to cordon off a resource of inherent value from much of the 
human race, because to do otherwise would be to adversely affect an elite few. 
In conclusion: liberal nationalists cannot escape the tension in their 
positions. Either they must fully endorse nationalism and acknowledge their 
conservatism (perhaps by defending the kind of cultural relativism that notori­
ously has been unjust regimes' defense against a call for human rights) or they 
should concede the injustice of nationalism and turn their efforts to outlin­
ing peacefully revolutionary processes whereby the boundaries between 
nation-states can wither away. 
Simon Cushing, University of Michigan-Flint 
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Political Doctrines (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 190. Often the historyor historical figures may be real enough, but they are not the history of one'snation. Stonehenge, for example, is often held up as something that the Englishshould be proud of, but England did not exist when it was built, and its buildersprobably did not produce descendants who would nowadays count as English.19. Although ethnicity is of course a problem case, and A. D. Smith has argued thatethnicity is the most important and pervasive basis of nationality. See Anthony D.Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).20. The most glaring atrocities have been ethnically motivated rather than explic­itly nationalistically motivated, it is true. But as "ethnicity" is a slippery, and almostcertainly conceptually bankrupt term, the divide between ethnic nationalism andcultural nationalism is difficult to draw. And one prominent writer on nationalismwho regards "ethnicity" at least as a legitimate notion, has argued that all nationshave an ethnic origin (Smith 1986).21. Renan, p. 203. The full quote acknowledges the importance of a shared historyas well: "Thus we see that a nation is a great solid unit, formed by the realization ofsacrifices in the past, as well as of those one is prepared to make in the future. Anation implies a past; while, as regards the present, it is all contained in one tangible
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Liberal Nationalism, Culture, and Justice fact, viz., the agreement and clearly expressed desire to continue a life in common. The existence of a nation is (if you will forgive me the metaphor) a daily plebiscite, just as that of the individual is a continued affirmation of life." 22. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). "Imagined" because each individualwill never meet the vast majority of her co-nationals, yet conjures up a sense ofcommunity nonetheless.23. Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape," 89.2 4. For an argument that nationalists can legitimately make use of falsehoods to foster a national spirit, see David Archard, "Myths, Lies and Historical Truth: A Defence of Nationalism" Political Studies 43 (1995): 472-481. 25. See Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape" and Miller, chapter 2.26. Kymlicka does stipulate that societal cultures are "institutionally complete"­that is, "containing a full range of social, educational, economic, and politicalinstitutions, encompassing both public and private life," Kymlicka, Multicultural
Citizenship, 78. However, to say that this is what distinguishes societal culturesfrom other kinds is simply to beg the question: statehood provides such things, sothe possession of them cannot be an argument for being awarded statehood.2 7. Ronald Dworkin, "liberal Community," California Law Review 77 (1989): 4 79-504; Margalit and Raz, "National Self-Determination," Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 439-461. 28. See especially Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1989), Multicultural Citizenship, 1995, and Politics in the Ver­
nacular, 2001.29. "Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options, andour societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes them meaning­ful to us," Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 83.30. Ibid., 76.31. Ibid., 80. David Miller also argues that without state boundaries, the forces ofglobal capitalism will homogenize all cultures-see Miller, 186-187.32. Dworkin, 228.33. Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative," Uni­
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 (1992): 751-793.34. One of the primary defining characteristics of an "encompassing group," Margalitand Raz's term for the kind of body of people eligible for the right of self-govern­ment, is that the people share a history, presumably to the exclusion of other humans.But I believe that all humans should be able to identify with the works of the Ancient
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Truth and Objectivity in Social Ethics Greeks, say, and not just modem Greeks because their national history creates some tenuous link with those actions. 35. Mill famously wrote that it was better for the Breton to assimilate to France, andthe Welshman to Britain than to "sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of pasttimes, revolving in his own little mental orbit," J.S. Mill, Considerations on Repre­
sentative Government (1861) in John Gray ed., On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1991), 431.36. Kymlicka defends rights of exclusion-see his example of Inuit residency restric­tions in Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 146-150.37. One might have a Millian reason to regret the passing of Isham culture, as Idiscuss below.38. I have not discussed the possibility of sudden and catastrophic loss of culture,where no slow assimilation is possible. Certainly this is something that individualsshould be protected against wherever possible. However, such collapses are invari­ably the result of illiberal actions, and a liberal can oppose them without therebycommitting herself to nationalism or "culturalism". (Thanks to an anonymous com­mentator for this point.)39. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 87-88.40. Kymlicka does note Michael Ignatieffs barb that nationalists are guilty of the"narcissism of minor differences" but in response only goes on to insist that "theevidence is overwhelming that the members of liberal cultures do value their cul­tural membership" (Ibid.). This is an inadequate response: they may indeed valuesuch membership, but that does not mean that we should be moved to respect thisattitude any more than we should value the racist's valued membership in what heperceives to be his own race. (Even if the nationalist's sentiment is not as clearlyrepugnant as the racist's, it is by no means clear that all nationalists are valuing thesame thing. Each nationalist could have a different reason for valuing her member­ship, and it is quite possible that other nationalists could reject that conception.Witness different people's ideas of what 'Un-American' behavior amounts to.)41. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 39.42. Will Kymlicka, "ls federalism a viable alternative to secession?" in Percy B.Lehning ed., Theories of Secession (London: Routledge, 1998), 111-150.4 3. This is too quick, and it is worth distinguishing, as Kymlicka does, between 
minority nationalism (a call for recognition of minority, almost invariably aborigi­nal, nations), with which he is most concerned from majority nationalism (which calls for nation-building practices that might see it as their goal to assimilate minor­ity nations). 44. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 4 3. It should be noted that he is saying herethat there is no clear alternative to liberal culturalism, where liberal nationalism is a
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form of liberal culturalism, but his earlier claim about consensus was concerning lib­
eral nationalism. How is this claim of victory "by default" to be assessed? 
45. Even if we stick to valuing national cultures, Kymlicka's list of national cultures is
arguably artificially restricted. I concur with several points in Brian Walker's valuable
analysis and critique of culturist nationalism (Walker, "Social Movements as National­
ism"): first, the criteria for nationhood seem to be tailored to fit pre-existing nations,
thereby undercutting the rights of diasporic groups and social movements. However,
once we acknowledge this chauvinism and remove requirements for nationhood (spe­
cifically territoriality) that are products of this jury-rigging, we see that there is an 
enormous profusion of potential nations (his main example is the homosexual nation)
thereby rendering the goal of statehood for each a practical impossibility.
46. As Walker (Ibid.) points out, if the only nations that can count as such are pre­
existing nations, then we are perpetrating a double injustice against nascent or
diasporic not-quite-nations: the actual nations already have territory and (usually)
some measure of institutional framework to protect their cultures, and now their
position is entrenched in theory. The "non-national" social movements, however,
do not even yet have a territory, or any opportunity to entrench their culture (even
to the extent of having streets named after cultural heroes) and are now denied even
the chance to achieve this status.
47. Miller, 186-187. Miller insists that eroding of national identities (on a cosmo­
politan model) would result in "the world market as the distributor of cultural
resources ... [which] will be bad news for the non-elite" because they will no longer
have access to the rich common cultures that once existed and their economic posi­
tion will "increasingly be determined by the workings of the global market". Both of
these only apply to the "non-elite" already living in first-world nations. The poor of
other countries never had access to those cultures and have fates that are already
determined by the workings of the global market.
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